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Abstract
This paper has two objectives: the ﬁrst is to jointly analyse monetary and ﬁscal policy with
a structural VAR model, evaluate the dynamic impact of policy shocks on U.S. output and
prices and the contributions of these two sources to ﬂuctuations in these variables. The second
objective is to investigate if and how the effects of monetary policy are altered by the inclusion
of ﬁscal policy variables in a benchmark monetary VAR. It is found that both monetary policy
and ﬁscal policy have small effects on output and the price level and that neither of these shocks
are important sources of ﬂuctuations in either variable. The magnitude of the responses of
output and prices to a monetary policy shock and the contribution of these shocks are reduced
signiﬁcantly once ﬁscal policy is introduced.
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∗Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.1. Introduction1
Analysing one policy at a time is like dancing a tango solo: it is a lot easier, but it is
incomplete and ultimately unfulﬁlling. 2
To date the empirical literature on structural VARs has focused almost exclusively on the
analysis of the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy. Different aspects of the monetary
policy transmission mechanism have been studied in the last twenty years both in the U.S. (Gor-
don and Leeper [1994], Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [1998], Gal´ ı [1992] and Bernanke
and Blinder [1992] are some examples) and in the G-7 (Sims [1992], who does not however
analyse all these countries, Canova and De Nicol´ o [2000] and Kim [1999]). Structural VARs
have become popular for several reasons. They have the advantage of imposing a minimal set
of economic restrictions and they also make it possible to simulate the dynamic responses to
policy shocks and to evaluate the relative importance of the different shocks to the economy.
Only recently in the literature on structural VARs, some attention has been devoted to the
analysis of ﬁscal policy. The main reason for this interest is the re-examination of ﬁscal policy
as an effective tool for the stabilisation of business cycle ﬂuctuations in European countries.
The creation of the European Monetary Union with a single central bank has left participating
countries with ﬁscal policy as the only tool for stabilisation. Thus any attempt to inﬂuence
the economy has to rely on taxation and public expenditure, within the limits imposed by the
Stability Pact. Another important reason for reconsidering the study of ﬁscal policy is the
debate on balanced budget rules and the federal surplus in the U.S. This has reawakened an
interest on the part of economists and policy-makers in the macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal
policy. Empirical analysis of the effects of ﬁscal policy has generally been carried out with
large-scale econometric models or with reduced-form models that looked at speciﬁc exogenous
ﬁscal policy events, such as the 1975:2 tax rebate, in the U.S.3 Other works such as Alesina and
Perotti [1995] or Giavazzi and Pagano [1990] have focused on the macroeconomic effects of
ﬁscal consolidation.
In the last two years a number of papers have used structural VARs to examine ﬁscal policy.
Blanchard and Perotti [1999] look separately at the effects of shocks to government spending
and taxes on output using U.S. data for the post-war period. The authors also analyse spe-
ciﬁc ﬁscal episodes, such as the 1975:2 tax rebate, using an event-study analysis. Edelberg,
Eichenbaum and Fisher [1998] and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher [1999] focus only on the
effects of military spending. These two papers rely on Ramey-Shapiro [1998] ﬁscal dummies.
1I would like to thank Fabio Canova for his supervision and all the participants at the student seminar at Pompeu
Fabra University and the Bank of Italy and two anonymous referees. I gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support
from the CESIFIN foundation (Centro per lo studio delle istituzioni ﬁnanziarie) of the Cassa di Risparmio of
Florence for the period in which I was at Pompeu Fabra University. I am also grateful to Ilian Mihov for providing
me with the data on ﬁscal variables. All remaining errors are mine. The opinions expressed in this paper do not
reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy. E-mail: neri.stefano@insedia.interbusiness.it
2Leeper [1993]
3For an example, see Blinder [1981].8
A dummy is created to capture the beginning of three military build-ups (the Korean war, the
Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan increase in military spending). A VAR is set up in order
to trace the effects of these three ﬁscal episodes on the main macroeconomic variables and then
theoretical models are developed to account for the main empirical ﬁndings. Fat´ as and Mihov
[1998] follow a different methodology in constructing a measure of discretionary ﬁscal policy.
They deﬁne a four-variable VAR using the ratio of primary deﬁcit to GDP as the measure of
ﬁscal policy. Structural ﬁscal shocks represent the discretionary component of ﬁscal policy.
One shortcoming of this measure is that it does not allow changes in taxation and expendi-
ture to have different effects on the economy since the two components cannot be disentangled.
Fat´ as and Mihov [1999] analyse the effects of different components of government spending on
a set of macroeconomic variables. Their paper also develops a theoretical business cycle model
that tries to match the empirical ﬁndings.
Blanchard and Watson [1986] have jointly analysed the effects of ﬁscal and monetary policy
with a structural VAR. The authors build an index (derived from Blanchard [1985]) to measure
the effects of ﬁscal policy and use M1 as indicator of monetary policy. However the VAR
does not include any interest rate and for this reason the speciﬁcation of monetary policy is
not correct since it is widely recognised that the federal funds rate is the best measure of the
stance of monetary policy in the U.S. According to Bernanke and Mihov [1998], the federal
funds rate has performed well as an indicator of monetary policy since the mid-1960s with the
sole exception of the Volcker period. The federal funds market dates back to the early 1950s.
However, only after the end of 1964 did this market begin to perform as it does nowadays.
The federal funds rate was never above the discount rate until October 1964 and was never
considered a useful indicator of the monetary policy stance (Strongin [1995]). Blanchard and
Watson [1986] provide evidence that aggregate demand, aggregate supply, ﬁscal and monetary
shocks are important in explaining ﬂuctuations in output and prices.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First we are interested in jointly analysing ﬁscal and
monetary policy and measuring their importance as sources of output and price ﬂuctuations.
Second, we are interested in assessing whether standard conclusions about the effects of mon-
etary policy are modiﬁed by the introduction of ﬁscal policy variables in VARs. The approach
taken differs from the existing literature in several aspects. First, contrary to Blanchard and
Watson [1986], it uses the federal funds rate and total reserves in order to specify and identify
monetary policy disturbances as it is done in Gordon and Leeper [1994]. Second, contrary to
Gordon and Leeper [1994] we use quarterly U.S. data and only a commodity price index to
capture future movements in the price level. A model that includes the term structure of interest
rates (the ten-year minus the three-month interest rate) to capture inﬂation expectations has also
been tried without gaining anything in terms of results and dynamic simulations. Third, with
respect to the choice of the ﬁscal policy indicator, we will start by following Fat´ as and Mihov
[1998] and focus our attention on the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP and then move on to
a speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy which explicitly uses revenue minus transfers and government9
expenditure4, as in Blanchard and Perotti [1999].
Two conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, the responses of output and prices
to ﬁscal policy shocks (measured either by an exogenous increase in revenue minus transfers
or an increase in the primary surplus to GDP ratio) and monetary policy shocks are similar
in pattern and are both statistically signiﬁcant. The effects of monetary and ﬁscal policy (in
particular when revenue minus transfers and government expenditure are considered) on real
GDP and the GDP deﬂator are small. The contribution of ﬁscal and monetary policy shocks
to ﬂuctuations in output and prices is small, suggesting that none of these shocks is a driving
source of ﬂuctuations. Second, the omission of ﬁscal variables from a VAR that only analyses
monetary policy affects the magnitude of the responses to monetary policy shocks. A statistical
test of the differences in the mean of the responses shows that monetary policy has a smaller
impact on real GDP once we control for ﬁscal policy. This result suggests that at least in the
past ﬁscal and monetary policy were correlated.
Theorganizationofthepaperisthefollowing. Section2brieﬂyanalysesﬁscalandmonetary
policy in the U.S. Section 3 considers a small monetary VAR that is used as a benchmark.
Section 4 introduces the ratio of primary deﬁcit to real GDP as the indicator of ﬁscal policy.
In Section 5 the primary deﬁcit is disaggregated into revenue minus transfers and government
expenditure. InSection6thesigniﬁcanceofthedifferencesintheresponsesofoutputandprices
to a monetary shock and the contributions of these shocks to ﬂuctuations is tested. Section 7
presents the ﬁnal conclusions.
2. A brief history of monetary and ﬁscal policy in the U.S.
The information provided here on monetary policy can be found in more detail in Walsh
[1998] and Strongin [1995]. The information on ﬁscal policy, the information comes from
Poterba [1988, 1996] and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher [1998] and Blanchard and Perotti
[1999]. The federal funds market began to function as the main source of liquidity for banks
in the mid-1960s. Between 1972 and 1979 the Federal Reserve adopted a federal funds rate
operating procedure under which it allowed nonborrowed reserves to stabilise the interest rate
within a narrow band around the target rate. Shocks to the demand for total reserves were offset
by open market operations and intended to keep the federal funds rate constant. In the period
1979-1982 there was a shift to a nonborrowed reserves operating procedure in order to reduce
the inﬂation rate. This corresponds to the Volcker era which ran from 1979:10 to 1982:10. The
shift to nonborrowed targeting was motivated by the need to exert greater control on monetary
aggregates growth rates. Under this operating procedure, in response to an increase in expected
inﬂation, the Fed would allow interest rates to rise, reducing money growth. The Volcker period
represents the most important shift in the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures given that all
the other regimes can be seen as variants of federal funds rate or borrowed reserves targeting.
Using a two-states Markov switching regime model, Bernanke and Mihov [1998] identify a
structural change in Federal Reserve operating procedures in the Volcker period. Since 1982 the
Fed has followed a borrowed reserves operating procedure whereby nonborrowed reserves are
4For details on the construction of ﬁscal variables see Appendix I.10
adjusted in order to insulate borrowed reserves from non-policy shocks. Nowadays monetary
policy is conducted by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which periodically ﬁxes
a target for the federal funds rate.
With respect to ﬁscal policy, two points deserve some attention. First, major ﬁscal shocks
occurred in the 1950s and 1960s (for example, the Korean military build-up, two large tax in-
creases in 1950:2 and 1950:3, the 1964 Kennedy-Johnson tax cut and the Vietnam war) and in
the 1980s (Reagan’s tax cuts in 1981 and 1986 and the increase in military spending). Second,
the ﬁscal policies of the 1980s, especially during the Reagan administration, resulted in in-
creased budget deﬁcits and growing public debt. This in turn led to the approval of the Gramm-
Rudman-Holling bill (1985) which had two objectives: ﬁrst to accelerate budget discussions
and to place deadlines earlier in the calendar year and, second, to introduce deﬁcit targets to-
gether with a mechanism for ensuring that actual deﬁcits did not exceed them. The Supreme
Court ruled the law unconstitutional. Analysts predicted that this legislation would not help to
control budget deﬁcits since the President and Congress could always agree to modify the tar-
gets. The failure to achieve deﬁcit targets led to the approval of the 1990 Budget Enforcement
Act (BEA) which introduced annual caps on discretionary spending and required any proposal
to increase spending on one program to be offset by cuts in other programs. The BEA was in
force from 1990 to 1998 (including the extension of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993). The main difference between the BEA and the Gramm-Rudman-Holling is that the
former reformed the budget process while the latter was only a declaration of deﬁcit targets.
Under the BEA, policies could be expected not to increase deﬁcits in any of the following ﬁve
years (a period known as ”the BEA window”).
Themostimportantﬁscaleventasfarasmagnitudesareconcernedwasthe1975:2taxrebate
(whichincludedanincreaseintransferpayments). Thisinvolveda10percenttaxrebateof1974
income taxes up to a maximum of 200 dollars and was designed to stimulate aggregate demand
after the ﬁrst oil shock. The intervention transferred 8.1 billion dollars from the Treasury to
householdsbetweenlateAprilandmid-June. Measuredin1987pricesitrepresentedanincrease
indisposableincomeofmorethan100billiondollars.5 ThistaxrebateisexaminedinBlanchard
and Perotti [1999] (and in Poterba [1988]) in an event study analysis where a dummy variable is
deﬁned for this event and the effects of the dummy on output are evaluated. Their work assumes
that the event is exogenous. However, the tax rebate in question was designed to stimulate
aggregate demand in response to the recession caused by the ﬁrst oil shock and therefore does
not exactly qualify as an exogenous ﬁscal policy shock.
5These ﬁgures come from Poterba [1988], who shows that the ﬁscal experiments of 1970s and 80s have a
detectable effect on consumption, while the news effect is very slight. Either consumers are shortsighted or they
face considerable liquidity constraints. The ﬁnding that the news effect of a ﬁscal intervention is small can be
helpful in justifying the use of VARs in analysing of ﬁscal policy.11
3. The benchmark VAR model: monetary policy
To evaluate if and how the above conclusions on the effects of monetary policy are modiﬁed
by introducing ﬁscal variables, we set up a simple benchmark VAR (from now on we will
refer to this model as M-VAR) making it possible to investigate the effects of monetary policy.
Fiscal variables will be introduced later on to measure any possible change with respect to
benchmark impulse responses and variance decompositions of output and prices. At the same
time, the effects of ﬁscal policy on output and prices will be evaluated. Moreover, the ability
of the models to capture the main ﬁscal and monetary policy events of the U.S. history will be
assessed.
The benchmark model is based on Gordon and Leeper [1994]. In this model a demand
for and a supply of total reserves are speciﬁed where the demand comes from commercial
banks who need to satisfy reserve requirements and to hold excess reserves and the supply is
assumed to be controlled by the Federal Reserve. The federal funds rate is the corresponding
measure of monetary policy. Explicit modelling of the reserves market allows us to disentangle
monetarypolicyshocks(i.e. shockstothesupplyoftotalreserves)fromreservedemandshocks.
The use of total reserves as monetary aggregate implicitly assumes that demanders of reserves
perceive borrowed and nonborrowed reserves as perfect substitutes. The variables in the model
are divided into two vectors: the non-policy one, Yt, that includes the log of a commodity price
index, the log of real GDP and the log of the implicit GDP deﬂator, and the policy vector Pt
comprising, initially, the federal funds rate (expressed on an annual basis) and the log of total




















The vector Yt contains the macroeconomic variables which we are interested in studying.
In order to identify the structural VAR we will assume that the vector of non-policy variables
cannot respond simultaneously to monetary policy shocks.6 In the literature on VARs, this
assumption is commonly made although it could be argued that it is more applicable to monthly
data than to quarterly data. We will deﬁne a monetary policy rule that speciﬁes the supply
of total reserves as a function of all the variables in the VAR. This is an information based
assumption given that the Federal Reserve observes the commodity index, real GDP, the GDP
deﬂator and the federal funds rate and reacts to changes in these variables by modifying the
6This assumption is made in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [1996] and in many other works, both with
monthly and quarterly data.12
supply of total reserves. The commodity price index is introduced in order to eliminate the
so-called ”price puzzle” i.e. the ﬁnding that after a contractionary monetary policy shock the
price level initially increases (Sims [1992]). The commodity index is intended to capture the
information the Federal Reserve has on future developments of the price level. In the reserves
demand equation, total reserves are assumed to depend on the level of economic activity, on the
price level and on the federal funds rate. The identiﬁcation matrix of the M-VAR and the others
that include ﬁscal policy variables are reported in Appendix II.
An important point in estimating structural VARs, as in all systems of equations, is the ques-
tion of normalising coefﬁcients whereby a value of 1 is given to the dependent variable in each
equation of the system. Waggoner and Zha [1997] showed that normalisation can signiﬁca-
tively affect the shape of the likelihood function and consequently the estimated coefﬁcients,
the shape of impulse responses and their probability distribution. They propose a solution to
avoid distorting the shape of the likelihood function but we will not be applying it here. Instead,
we will proceed in two steps. First we estimate the model leaving the main diagonal elements
free, then we reestimate the model normalising these coefﬁcients to 1. By comparing the re-
sulting estimates we can evaluate whether the shape of the likelihood function is distorted. The
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where A0 is a square matrix containing the coefﬁcients that simultaneously link the variables of
















is the system of equations linking structural shocks to reduced-form disturbances. Since the
covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR, Σ has n(n+1)/2 different moments, a maximum
number of 15 coefﬁcients of the A0 matrix can be estimated in the M-VAR. In this case the ele-
ments of the main diagonal are not normalised to 1, and the covariance matrix of the structural
shocks is assumed to be the identity matrix. The crucial element of the VAR is the identiﬁca-
tion matrix A0. Different identifying assumptions would imply a different speciﬁcation of this
matrix and potentially different impulse responses and variance decompositions.
The reduced form VAR7 is estimated consistently in levels with OLS. Then the concentrated
log-likelihood is maximized (Full Information Maximum Likelihood) with respect to the free
7Data are quarterly and the sample period goes from 1965:1 to 1996:4. The selection of the lag number was13
coefﬁcientsoftheA0 matrix.8 Table1reportstheestimatedmonetarypolicyruleoftheM-VAR.
Allthecoefﬁcientsofthemonetarypolicyrulearesigniﬁcantat5percentandhavetheexpected
signs, namely the Fed increases the federal funds rate whenever the commodity index increases,
since this will produce an increase in the price level in the near future, and whenever real GDP
and the GDP deﬂator increase. The coefﬁcients of the total reserves demand equation, which
are not reported, also have the expected signs: the demand for total reserves varies inversely
with the federal funds rate and positively with the level of economic activity and the price level.
However, this last coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant.
3.1 Comments on impulse responses and variance decompositions
The monetary policy shocks we captured are associated with the following responses of the
variables included in the M-VAR: (i) an increase in the federal funds rate, (ii) a decrease in total
reserves, (iii) a sharp and fast decline in the commodity price index, and (iv) a decline in real
GDP and a delayed reduction in the GDP deﬂator (ﬁgures 2 and 3 report the responses of output,
prices, total reserves and the interest rate9). After a contractionary shock, real GDP responds by
decreasing with the classical humped shape response with the maximum decrease of real GDP
reached after 12 quarters. The real GDP goes back to its initial level after 18 quarters which
suggests that monetary policy does not permanently affects output. An unexpected increase of
1.0 per cent in the federal funds rate produces a maximum decrease, after 10 quarters, of slightly
more than 0.4 per cent in real GDP. This response is consistent with the interest rate channel of
monetary policy transmission since the initial impulse to the federal funds rate is propagated to
lending rates which affect ﬁrms’ investment choices and households’ consumption of durable
goods. The GDP deﬂator response is permanent. It builds up slowly and is still signiﬁcant
after 32 quarters with a decrease of more than 1 per cent. From the analysis of these impulse
responses we can conclude that monetary policy has permanent effects on the level of nominal
variables. These results are robust to various identiﬁcation schemes that have been proposed
in the literature. The patterns of these responses are very similar, for example, to the ones in
Bernanke and Mihov [1998], who use a different identiﬁcation scheme to separate total reserves
into nonborrowed and borrowed reserves. The authors ﬁnd a signiﬁcant price response only
after 24 months and a transitory response of real GDP. In Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
[1996] impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, identiﬁed alternatively by innovations in
nonborrowed reserves and in the the federal funds rate, are also similar in shape and persistence
to ours.
We now turn to examine the decomposition of the forecast error variance in order to evaluate
made using the Akaike and Schwarz criterion and looking at the autocorrelation function of the reduced form
residuals, in order to get uncorrelated reduced-form disturbances. These two criteria led to the selection 6 lags for
all the VARs considered in this paper.
8The results of the paper are robust to different identiﬁcation schemes of the block of the Yt variables.
9Error bands and variance decomposition intervals are computed by means of Monte Carlo integration follow-
ing Sims and Zha [1999]. In this paper the authors show how to compute error bands for overidentiﬁed structural
VARs. All impulse responses graphs display .68 and .95 ﬂat-prior probability intervals. The authors also sug-
gest presenting the principal components of the impulse responses since uncertainty about these is not serially
independent across time. The graphs report the ﬁrst and second components of the impulse responses.14
the contributions of monetary policy shocks to ﬂuctuations in real GDP and the GDP deﬂator.
Tables 2 reports the median and .68 probability intervals of the k-step-ahead forecast error
variance. Monetary shocks become important in generating output ﬂuctuations after 2 years,
accounting for a median value of 12 per cent. After 32 quarters these shocks account for 24
per cent of the variance of output, suggesting that monetary shocks are an important source of
ﬂuctuations. In Gordon and Leeper [1994] the percentage of forecast error variance in output
and prices reaches respectively 33 and 22 per cent after 36 months. In Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans [1996], monetary policy shocks identiﬁed by exogenous innovations in the federal
funds rate account for 30 per cent of the 24 quarter-ahead forecast error variance of real GDP.
At the same time non-borrowed reserves policy shocks account for 11 per cent. In Strongin
[1995] innovations in nonborrowed reserves that are orthogonal to total reserves account 49 per
cent of the variance in industrial production at the end of two years.
With respect to the price level, monetary policy shocks account for 25 per cent of the vari-
ability after 32 quarters, suggesting that these shocks, together with commodity prices shocks,
are the most important source of price ﬂuctuations (the ﬁgures on non-monetary shocks are not
reported in this paper since the focus is exclusively on monetary and ﬁscal shocks). In Gordon
and Leeper [1994] nearly 30 per cent of the variability of the price level is due to monetary
policy shocks after 36 months. In the medium term at 8 and 16 quarters, commodity prices
shocks are the most important source of ﬂuctuations in prices. After 2 years, 60 per cent of
the variability of the GDP deﬂator is due to shocks to these prices. Commodities are part of
nearly all production processes and therefore their prices affect ﬁrms pricing decisions signif-
icantly. This result underlines the fact that commodity prices are an important informational
variable for assessing future developments in the price level. These results, together with the
impulse response analysis, show that monetary policy shocks have signiﬁcant effects on output
and prices.
The ﬁgures of the variance decomposition of real GDP and the GDP deﬂator will be used in
the comparison of the forecast error variance decomposition obtained in the VARs where ﬁscal
variables are introduced.
4. Introducing ﬁscal policy: the primary deﬁcit
Different methods have been proposed in the literature for constructing indicators of ﬁscal
stance. They all aim at capturing discretionary changes in the budget i.e changes due not to the
endogenous response of budget components to the state of the economy but to exogenous ﬁscal
policyactions. TheyallfollowBlanchard’sadvicethattheindicatorshouldbesimpleevenatthe
cost of ignoring relatively important considerations. Blanchard [1990] builds an indicator of the
stance of ﬁscal policy by estimating what government revenue and expenditure would be if the
unemployment rate were at the level of the previous period. The difference between the actual
deﬁcit and the estimated deﬁcit is the indicator of ﬁscal policy. The simplest measure of ﬁscal
impulse available is the change in the primary deﬁcit from the previous year. In this measure
the benchmark value is assumed to be the level of the previous year. Other methods are used
by the IMF and the OECD. These measures try to estimate what is called the structural budget15
balance, an indicator providing information on medium-term ﬁscal policy. The construction
of the structural budget balance involves three steps: (i) estimating potential output and the
corresponding output gap; (ii) computing the cyclical component of expenditure and revenue;
and (iii) calculating the structural budget balance by subtracting the ciclycal components from
observed levels of revenue and expenditure. According to the IMF’s methodology, structural
revenue is computed by adjusting observed revenue by an amount that reﬂects both the size of
the output gap and the cyclical sensitivity of revenue. Structural expenditure are obtained by
adjusting observed expenditure in proportion to the gap between actual and natural (NAIRU)
rates of unemployment. A similar methodology is used by the OECD. In this section we will
use the ratio of primary deﬁcit to GDP as the indicator of ﬁscal policy as in Fat´ as and Mihov
[1998]. TheprimarydeﬁcitequationoftheVAR(wewillrefertothismodelasPD-VAR)isused
to eliminate any ﬂuctuation in the primary deﬁcit that is due to business cycles. The difference
between actual deﬁcit and its endogenous component is used to derive the ﬁscal shocks.
One shortcoming of choosing the primary deﬁcit as an indicator of ﬁscal policy is that the
effects of government expenditure and revenue cannot be separated. This amounts to assuming
that changes in taxation and in expenditure have the same dynamic effects on the economy.
We will use ﬁscal data for the federal government since the federal government is responsible
for ﬁscal policy in the US. Moreover, the inclusion of state and local data may, a priori, affect
the results because of idiosyncratic changes in state and local government budgets. However
using the primary deﬁcit deﬁnition for general government leads to the same qualitative results.
Contrary to Fat´ as and Mihov [1998] we will use total GDP instead of private sector GDP (GDP
net of government spending), since this is a more conventional measure of economic activity
and has been used in most empirical monetary policy exercises. Restrictions must be imposed
in order to identify ﬁscal shocks. We will assume that real GDP and the GDP deﬂator cannot
respond to the ﬁscal indicator.10 Contrary to Blanchard and Watson [1986] we will estimate
the ﬁscal rule instead of imposing it using outside estimates of the relative elasticities. It is
assumed that the primary deﬁcit/GDP ratio depends simultaneously on real GDP and on the
GDP deﬂator; while expenditure may be acyclical, revenue and transfers depend on the level
of economic activity and also on the overall price level since these aggregates are expressed in
nominal terms. Fiscal and monetary policy are assumed to be set independently. This restriction
denies any simultaneous response of one policy variable to the other.11 The estimated policy
rules are reported in Table 1: all coefﬁcients are signiﬁcative at 95 per cent. These coefﬁcients
are those of the fourth and ﬁfth rows of the second A0 matrix in Appendix II. These policy rules
must be interpreted as capturing the endogenous response of the ﬁscal and monetary indicator
to the state of the economy. The reported coefﬁcients refer to the elements of the primary deﬁcit
and interest rate equations reported in the second A0 matrix in Appendix II.
The coefﬁcients in the ﬁscal policy rule have the expected signs, that is the primary surplus
10Allowing output and prices to respond simultaneously to a ﬁscal shock does not alter the impulse responses in
any way.
11This means the reduced form residuals of the primary deﬁcit do not enter in the residuals of the federal funds
rate equation and viceversa. However, the conclusions of this paper are not affected by assuming dependence
between the two policies.16
increases if the level of economic activity rises and if the price level increases. This happens
because there are budget components, such as revenue and transfers, that depend on the level of
economic activity and are expressed in nominal terms. The coefﬁcients in the monetary policy
rule also have the expected signs and show little change compared with those reported for the
M-VAR.
4.1 Criticisms of the use of structural VARs in analysing ﬁscal policy
The use of VARs for ﬁscal policy analysis is subject to a simple criticism, namely, the long
lag between the announcementof a ﬁscal intervention (say, a tax cut) and the time the measure
is actually enacted by congress and affects taxpayers. However, the presence of shortsighted
consumers and liquidity constraints can signiﬁcantly reduce the announcement effect on con-
sumption. Moreover, the announcement of a tax cut might raise expectations of future tax
increases, in which case under Ricardian equivalence, there would be no effect on consump-
tion. Poterba [1988] studied the effect on consumption of the ﬁscal experiments of the 1970s
and 80s. He found a signiﬁcant effect on consumption following the implementation of policies
but a very slight announcement effect. On the other hand, a policy of subsidies for the scrapping
of old cars (applied in Italy, France and other countries) might have an important news effect on
new car purcjases by inducing consumers to postpone their purchases until the implementation
of the subsidy. This would result in a reduction of the number of cars bought and probabily a
decrease in current production, or more likely an increase in inventories. As will be shown be-
low, the structural VAR is capable of capturing a number of ﬁscal interventions, thus justifying
its use for ﬁscal policy analysis.
4.2 Comments on impulse responses and variance decompositions
An increase of 1.0 per cent in the primary surplus to GDP ratio produces a maximum decline
in output of more than 0.6 per cent after 16 quarters. The response of real GDP is not permanent
since output goes back to its initial level after 20 quarters (see Figures 6 and 7). The price level
decreases persistently after a contractionary ﬁscal policy shock. The response of prices to ﬁscal
policy is similar to the response to a monetary policy shock in that it becomes signiﬁcant after 6
quarters. The response of prices is very slow which indicates that prices may be sticky. After 32
quarters prices are 1.6 per cent below their initial level. The response of the interest rate is not
statistically signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst 20 quarters (see Figure 6). An increase in the surplus, due to
an increase in taxation, for example, reduces disposable income and determines a decrease in
consumption. This decrease in aggregate demand causes the price level and output to decrease.
The responses of output and prices to a contractionary ﬁscal policy shock have the same patterns
as the responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock since both produce a decline in real
GDP and in the GDP deﬂator. Fiscal policy seems to be as effective as monetary policy.
We now examine the response of real GDP and the GDP deﬂator to an identiﬁed monetary
policy shock. Following a contractionary monetary policy shock, output decreases with the
classical humped shape response where the maximum response is reached after 12 quarters.
The response of output is not permanent since it goes back to the initial level after 24 quarters.17
The response of real GDP is signiﬁcantly different from zero for 14 quarters. An increase of 1.0
percentinthefederalfundsrateproducesamaximumdeclineinrealGDPof0.2percent, which
is smaller than the decrease of 0.4 per cent found in the M-VAR (Figure 4). Monetary policy
has real effects even if these are small. With respect to prices, the response becomes signiﬁcant
after 5 quarters and remains so for more than 32 quarters (at .68 conﬁdence level). After 32
quarters prices are 0.6 per cent below the initial level. In the benchmark model the decrease
of the price level after 32 quarters is more than 1.0 per cent. By comparing the responses of
output and prices in the two VARs analysed, we can see that the magnitudes of the responses
to monetary policy shock change when the primary deﬁcit is introduced in the M-VAR. The
shapes, however, are very similar. The signiﬁcance of the differences in the magnitudes will be
tested in Section 6 with an appropriate test.
Table 3 shows the forecast error variance decomposition for real GDP. For comparison we
also report in parentheses the ﬁgures obtained in the M-VAR. The contribution of monetary
shocks to output ﬂuctuations is substantially smaller than in the benchmark model. In this
VAR, monetary policy shocks accounted for 24 per cent of output variability while in the model
analysed in this section they account for no more than 9 per cent at 40 quarters. The signiﬁcance
of this difference and that of the price level will be tested in Section 6. At the same time ﬁscal
shocks account for 12 per cent of the ﬂuctuations in real GDP after 40 quarters. These ﬁgures
on the importance of monetary policy shocks are close to those obtained by Uhlig [1999] who
uses an identiﬁcation procedure that relies on restrictions on the signs of impulse responses.12
The author ﬁnds that monetary policy shocks may easily account for less than 3 per cent of
the variability of real GDP. Our results also suggest that monetary policy shocks may have
very small real effects. However, it is important to underline that this result only applies to
the exogenous component of monetary policy. The endogenous component is likely to have
important real effects. Fiscal policy shocks are an important source of ﬂuctuations in real GDP
in the medium and long-term as are monetary policy shocks . It is also important to note
the reduction in the percentage of variance of the GDP deﬂator explained by monetary policy
shocks: from 25 per cent of the benchmark model to 9 per cent of the ﬁscal VAR at 40 quarters.
At the same time, ﬁscal policy shocks seem to be a more important source of variability in prices
accounting for 22 per cent at 40 quarters. This result may seem puzzling. However, it only
means that the unexpected component of ﬁscal policy is more important than the corresponding
component of monetary policy, which is perhaps more predictable.
How can the simple introduction of a ﬁscal policy variable have such signiﬁcant effects on
the contribution of monetary policy shocks to ﬂuctuations in output and the magnitudes of the
impulse responses? One possibility is that because ﬁscal shocks play an important role in de-
termining output and price ﬂuctuations, a VAR that does not include a ﬁscal policy indicator is
likely to give a distorted view of the relative importance of monetary versus ﬁscal policy shocks
as sources of ﬂuctuations of real GDP and the GDP deﬂator. From an econometric point of
view, it is essentially a problem of omitted variables and misspeciﬁcation of the reduced-form
of the VAR, which leads to inconsistent estimates of the coefﬁcients. Since impulse responses
12The paper analyses only monetary policy.18
and variance decompositions are non-linear functions of the reduced-form coefﬁcients, they are
also inconsistently estimated. The federal funds rate captures the effects of the ﬁscal policy in-
dicator, the omitted variable, on output and prices and these two measures actually tend to raise
during expansions and decrease in slowdowns and recessions (see Figure 1). The consequences
of misspecifying vector autoregressions are analysed in detail in Braun and Mittinik [1993],
who show that the omission of relevant variables, the incorrect speciﬁcation of lag lengths or
the incorrect orthogonalization of innovations produce inconsistent impulse responses and vari-
ance decompositions. In particular, with respect to point estimates, the misspeciﬁcation effects
can be dramatic. However, the importance of inconsistencies is reduced once uncertainty on
the parameter estimates is considered. Variance decompositions are more sensitive than im-
pulse responses to misspeciﬁcations, since they are essentially ratios of potentially inconsistent
quantities. This is exactly what we obtain by misspecifying the M-VAR: the point estimates
of the contributions of monetary shocks to ﬂuctuations in output and prices are signiﬁcantly
affected by the omission of ﬁscal policy variables. In order to test the robustness of this result in
the next section we modify the M-VAR by including separately the components of the federal
government budget, revenue minus transfers and expenditure.
4.3 Structural ﬁscal and monetary shocks
In this section we evaluate whether the structural ﬁscal and monetary policy shocks we have





where Ut represents the vector of reduced form residuals. Structural ﬁscal shocks provide a
measure of discretionary ﬁscal policy. Figure 8 reports the structural monetary and ﬁscal policy
shocks. Turning to the analysis of ﬁscal shocks, several ﬁscal events can be identiﬁed: the
strong adjustment of 1969 (the surtax approved in 1968:2, a temporary increase in taxation); the
expansion of 1967 (this event is highlighted in Blanchard and Perotti [1999] as an expenditure
shock); the tax rebate of the second quarter of 1975; the Reagan tax cut of 1981 (Economic
Recovery Tax Cut) which was approved in August 1982, and the increase in military spending
in 1980 . Therefore it seems that the VAR is performing quite well in capturing the most
important ﬁscal events in the post-war U.S. data. We consider this an important criterion in
the overall evaluation of the VAR model. It is important to underline that policy shocks are
observed at the time of implementation because it is at this time that the budget is affected.
With respect to monetary policy shocks Figure 8 clearly highlights the Volcker era in which
the volatility of the federal funds rate increased because of nonborrowed targeting. The interest
rate had to adjust in order to equate supply and demand for total reserves. The anti-inﬂationary
shock of 1979:2 is clearly detectable (Romer and Romer [1989]). The expansionary policy of
1983 and 1992 are also detectable (these events are the ones highlighted in Bernanke and Mihov
[1998] who compare their indicator with the Romers’ dates and the Boschen-Mills index.19
5. Disaggregating the federal budget into revenue and expenditure
In this section we disaggregate the federal primary deﬁcit into revenue minus transfers and
expenditure, following Blanchard and Perotti [1999]. The authors specify a three variable VAR
to analyse the effects of ﬁscal policy alone on real GDP. This is because the use of the primary
deﬁcit implicitly assumes that shocks to revenue or expenditure have the same impact on output
and prices. With this new speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy (we will refer to the VAR analysed in this
section as RE-VAR) we will be able to differentiate between the effects of tax and expenditure
shocks and we will test the robustness of the results on the effects of monetary policy obtained
with the PD-VAR . We are interested in assessing the relative importance of shocks to revenue
and to expenditure and in evaluating the dynamic responses of output and prices to each of these
two shocks separately. We also want to evaluate the changes in the impulse responses and in the
variance decomposition in relation to the two VAR analysed above. The result on the relative
importance of ﬁscal and monetary shocks obtained with the primary deﬁcit may be due to the
speciﬁc measure of ﬁscal policy that we have used. With respect to the restrictions, the same
identiﬁcation scheme of the previous VAR holds i.e. ﬁscal variables depends simultaneously on
real GDP and on the GDP deﬂator for the same reason as the primary deﬁcit does. However,
with respect to the PD-VAR, we now allow real GDP and the GDP deﬂator to respond to ﬁscal
variables because government expenditure is likely to have a contemporaneous effect on output.
Our result on the consequences of omitting ﬁscal variables for monetary policy still holds if
we assume that output and prices cannot respond within a quarter to ﬁscal policy shocks. In
addition we assume that taxation decisions are taken once expenditure has been decided. This
assumption is also present in Blanchard and Perotti [1999], although they ﬁnd that the same
conclusion is obtained no matter which decision is taken ﬁrst. We have also tested the two
speciﬁcations without obtaining any substantial changes in the results. The estimated policy
rules are reported in Table 1. All the estimated parameters in the monetary policy rule are
signiﬁcant at 95 per cent and the same is true for the two ﬁscal policy equations with the only
exception of the price level in the expenditure equation. All the coefﬁcients have the expected
signs. These coefﬁcients are those of the fourth, ﬁfth and sixth row in the third A0 matrix in
Appendix II. The coefﬁcients of the monetary policy rule are similar to those of the benchmark
monetary policy rule. The coefﬁcients of the tax policy rule have the correct signs: revenue
increases when the tax base, related to GDP, increases and when the price level increases (since
revenue is in nominal terms). The expenditure policy rule suggests that government expenditure
increases when output decreases.
5.1 Comments on impulse responses and variance decompositions
We now comment on impulse responses to monetary and ﬁscal policy shocks. Fiscal shocks
now have two components: revenue shocks and expenditure shocks. With respect to a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock, the pattern previously obtained is repeated, with real GDP
declining with the classical humped shape and the GDP deﬂator slowly declining. An increase
of 1.0 per cent in the federal funds rate produces a maximum decrease of real GDP of 0.26 per
cent which is lower than the 0.4 of the benchmark case.20
Figure 16 presents a comparison of the mean impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
in the three VAR speciﬁcations. Error bands are not presented to make the comparison easier.
The responses of real GDP are different in terms of magnitude and persistence although the
shapes are very similar. Output responds with the classical humped shape in all three speciﬁca-
tions. For the GDP deﬂator, the M-VAR implies a greater response to a monetary policy shock.
These differences (which will be tested in Section 6) in the impulse responses are also reﬂected
in the differences in the contributions of monetary policy shocks to ﬂuctuations in output and
prices. The omission of ﬁscal policy increases the effects of monetary policy on the economy.
Again, the explanation for this result is that the federal funds rate in the benchmark captures
the effects of the ﬁscal variables when these are omitted. This result is robust to the speciﬁ-
cation of ﬁscal policy variables since it has been obtained either by using the primary deﬁcit
or by disaggregating the budget into revenue minus transfers and expenditure. For comparison
purposes we report the impulse responses to an exogenous increase in the federal funds rate,
obtained by means of the Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [1996] VAR modiﬁed to include
the ratio of the primary deﬁcit to GDP as the indicator of ﬁscal policy.13 Figure 17 reports the
impulse responses of real GDP and the GDP deﬂator to a contractionary monetary policy shock
with and without ﬁscal variables. The result we have previously obtained with our VAR models
is clearly conﬁrmed, namely the omission of a ﬁscal policy indicator modiﬁes the conclusion
about the quantitative effects of monetary policy. The maximum contraction of output is halved
in the VAR that includes the ﬁscal variable. The response of the GDP deﬂator also changes
signiﬁcantly. With respect to the variance decomposition, the contribution of monetary policy
shocks is reduced when ﬁscal policy is introduced in the Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
[1996] VAR since the percentage of the variability of output and prices is reduced by 50 per
cent. The results are conﬁrmed if revenue minus transfers and expenditure are used in place of
the primary deﬁcit. Overall, these results suggest that the explanation we proposed above on
the misspeciﬁcation of monetary VARs is correct and may be robust to different identiﬁcation
schemes.
Turning to the analysis of ﬁscal shocks, it can be seen that a contractionary ﬁscal shock mea-
sured by an exogenous increase in revenue induces a signiﬁcant decrease in real GDP which is
signiﬁcatively different from zero. An increase of 1.0 per cent in revenue produces a decline in
output of 0.08 per cent after 13 quarters. The price level permanently decreases after the ﬁscal
policy shock and after 32 quarters prices are 0.24 per cent below their baseline value. An in-
crease in distorsionary taxation produces a decline in disposable income which in turns reduces
consumption. The decrease in aggregate demand determines a contraction of the price level. An
expansionary ﬁscal policy measured by an exogenous increase in government expenditure im-
mediately produces a small increase in output that lasts for two years. The response of output
compared with the initial increase in expenditure suggests that the response of private-sector
real GDP might be negative. This may be due to the rise in the interest rate (see Figure 13 and
14) and revenue (which is not shown). In fact, an expansionary ﬁscal policy causes the interest
rate and revenue to increase which in turn lowers investment and consumption thus smoothing
the impact on output. This suggets the existence of a crowding-out effect of government expen-
13The results are robust to the ordering between monetary and ﬁscal policy variables.21
diture shocks. The response of the price level is not signiﬁcant. The responses of output are
in line with those obtained by Blanchard and Perotti [1999] from a qualitative point of view.
However, our model suggests a smaller response of output which dies out more quickly. The
reason for this difference may be that Blanchard and Perotti (1999) omit a short-term interest
rate and so they are not able to capture the crowding-out that is present in our VAR.
The next step is to compute the variance decomposition of the forecast error of output and
prices and to compare these results with those of the M-VAR. Table 5 shows that the contri-
bution of monetary policy to output ﬂuctuations falls to 8 per cent (9 per cent in the PD-VAR)
at 40 quarters compared with the 24 per cent of the benchmark case. These ﬁgures conﬁrm
that monetary policy shocks contribute little to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. It must be noted
that there are differences in the contributions of all the different shocks. However the most
signiﬁcant change is precisely the one regarding monetary policy shocks. This result is robust
to the use of different indicators of ﬁscal policy as shown by the two VARs with ﬁscal vari-
ables. Therefore it is conﬁrmed that by ignoring ﬁscal policy we are likely to overestimate the
importance of monetary policy shocks in determining output ﬂuctuations. The changes with
respect to the benchmark model will be tested in Section 6. Expenditure shocks contribute
very little to ﬂuctuations in real GDP in the long-run accounting for no more than 5 per cent.
Revenue shocks account for a greater percentage, reaching 9 per cent after 40 quarters. With
respect to the variance decomposition of the GDP deﬂator, the contribution of monetary shocks
decreases to 9 per cent from a benchmark value of 25 per cent. Monetary policy, together with
commodity shocks, is still the most important source of ﬂuctuations in prices in the long run.
Revenue shocks contribute signiﬁcantly to the variability of prices (15 per cent at 40 quarters).
Expenditure shocks account for 3 per cent of the forecast error variance of prices, the lowest
contribution among policy shocks.
The result is thus conﬁrmed that monetary policy is close to being neutral when the pri-
mary deﬁcit is disaggregated into revenues minus transfers and consumption expenditure. The
explanation is the same as the one we have given for the results obtained with the PD-VAR
i.e. the omission of relevant variables produces inconsistent impulse responses and variance
decompositions. The same misspeciﬁcation result is obtained if monetary policy variables are
dropped from the RE-VAR. In this case revenue shocks become the most important source of
ﬂuctuations in real GDP and in the GDP deﬂator (accounting for nearly 35 per cent and 27 per
cent respectively of the forecast error variance). Impulse responses (see Figures 18 and 19)
show that a positive revenue shock has a severely negative impact on output and prices. These
responses are very similar in sign and shape to the responses to a contractionary monetary pol-
icy shock obtained in the M-VAR. An expansionary expenditure shock produces an increase
in the price level and a very small increase in output (see Figures 20 and 21 for the so-called
F-VAR, the VAR with only ﬁscal policy). The positive response of prices is not present in the
VAR that includes monetary variables because the increase in the interest rate offsets the initial
expansionary shock. This result conﬁrms that in order to correctly evaluate the effects of ﬁscal
and monetary policy shocks, both policies should be considered in the same VAR.22
5.2 Structural ﬁscal and monetary shocks
Figure 15 presents the structural ﬁscal and monetary policy shocks captured in the RE-VAR.
With respect to tax shocks, the 1975:2 tax rebate is clearly detectable and represents the most
important event in the post-war history of ﬁscal policies in the U.S. in terms of magnitude. The
1981 Reagan’s tax reduction plan is also detectable together with the 1968 surtax (a temporary
increase in taxation). Expenditure shocks highlight the Vietnam war and an important increase
in government expenditure in 1972 and a signiﬁcative decrease in 1983. Large expenditure
shocks also occurred before 1973. With respect to monetary policy, the anti-inﬂationary period
under Volcker chairmanship, is clearly detectable. The expansionary episodes in 1974 and 1992
when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to help the economy recover are also captured by
the VAR.
6. Do we really need to model both ﬁscal and monetary policy?
The introduction of ﬁscal policy variables in the M-VAR affects the magnitude of the re-
sponses of output and prices to a monetary policy shock without making any alterations to the
shapes. Up to now this conclusion has only been based on a qualitative analysis. In this section
we will test the signiﬁcance of the differences in the magnitudes of the responses of output
and prices to a monetary policy shock in the three models we have analysed. The test will be
based on the ﬁrst and second principal components. For each quarter of the impulse response














where k = 1,..,K is the step at which the impulse responses are evaluated, ¯ ci gives the average
responses of real GDP and the GDP deﬂator (b stands for benchmark and f for the two ﬁscal
models, while i stands for real GDP and the GDP deﬂator) and σ2(¯ ci(k)) is their variance.14
The responses are normalised so that in all the VARs a monetary shock is equal to a one per
cent increase in the federal funds rate. According to Sims and Zha [1999] the impulse responses
can be represented in terms of the principal components of their estimated covariance matrix Ω




where cij is the response of variable i to shock j, ˆ cij is the estimated mean response of variable i
to shock j, γk is a random variable with mean zero and variance equal to the kth eigenvalue of Ω,
14Thevarianceofthekth principalcomponentofcij(t)atsteptisequaltoλkW·k(t)2 whereλk iskth eigenvalue
of the estimated variance covariance matrix of impulse responses.23
andW·k thecorrespondingeigenvector. Theresultsfromthetestsbasedontheﬁrstcomponent15
(see Table 7) are the following: the response of real GDP in the M-VAR is signiﬁcantly greater
than in the two other VARs (for the ﬁrst 11 quarters in both ﬁscal VARs) while the differences in
the response of the GDP deﬂator are signiﬁcantly different from zero only for the ﬁrst 4 quarters
in the RE-VAR.
The results for the second and third component are reported respectively in Tables 8 and 9.
An overall evaluation of the signiﬁcance of these differences can be obtained by summing χ2
statistics over the number of steps in the response horizon: this sum is distributed as a χ2 with as
many degrees of freedom as the number of steps, K. Overall, the results for both comparisons
(Table 10) are that there is a signiﬁcant difference, using alternatively the ﬁrst, the second or the
third component, in the responses of both real GDP and the GDP deﬂator to a monetary policy
shock.
The χ2 statistic in (7) is then used to test the differences in the contributions of monetary
shocks to output and price ﬂuctuations.16 The result for real GDP is that there is a signiﬁcant
difference only between 1 and 6 quarters (PD-VAR) and between 3 and 5 quarters (RE-VAR)
when the ﬁrst component of the variance decompositions is used. With respect to the price level,
no difference is found to be signiﬁcant.17 When the second component is used in the test, the
differences, in both ﬁscal VARS, with respect to real GDP are signiﬁcant after 13 quarters (PD-
VAR and RE-VAR) and 19 quarters as far as the price level is concerned. When the sum of the
chisquare statistics is computed using the ﬁrst principal component of variance decompositions,
the differences in the contributions of monetary shocks are signiﬁcant only for output. When
the second component is used the differences are signiﬁcant for both output and prices. The
results hold for both the PD-VAR and the RE-VAR.
Overall, these tests have shown that the bias, due to the omission of ﬁscal variables from the
M-VAR, is greater for the response of real GDP to a monetary policy shock. Similar results are
obtained for the decomposition of the variances of the forecast error.
7. Conclusions
This paper has shown that ﬁscal and monetary policy have both small effects on output and
the price level. Neither ﬁscal nor monetary policy shocks are important source of ﬂuctuations
of real GDP and the GDP deﬂator. A contractionary monetary policy shock decreases output
and prices as well as does a contractionary ﬁscal policy shock, measured alternatively by an
exogenous increase in revenue or in the primary surplus to GDP ratio. Expenditure shocks have
15The ﬁrst component accounts on average for 50 per cent of the variance of the responses of real GDP and
nearly 90 per cent with respect to the GDP deﬂator. The second component explains about 25 per cent of the
variance of the response of real GDP and 9 per cent for the price level while the third component accounts for,
respectively, 15 and 3 per cent.
16In order to save space the tables are not presented. They are available upon request.
17The ﬁrst components account for more than 80 per cent of the variance of the contributions of monetary
shocks, the second component for 10 per cent on average and the third one for less than 3 per cent in the three
models.24
very small and short-lived effects on output and no effect on prices.
This paper also provides another, perhaps more interesting, result. Using the structural
VAR methodology, we have shown that the introduction of ﬁscal variables has important con-
sequences on the magnitudes of the response of real GDP and the GDP deﬂator to a monetary
policy shock. A statisticaltest on thesigniﬁcance ofthe differences betweenthe mean responses
has shown that the impact on real GDP is signiﬁcantly smaller in the VARs that include ﬁscal
policy variables. The contribution of monetary shocks to ﬂuctuations in output and prices is
also affected by the introduction of ﬁscal variables. This result is obtained either by using the
ratio of the primary deﬁcit to GDP or by disaggregating the budget into expenditure and rev-
enue minus transfers. If one is concerned with evaluating qualitatively the dynamic responses
of output and prices to a monetary policy shock, ﬁscal variables may be omitted. On the other
hand, if the focus is on the quantitative effects of monetary policy (especially on output), on its
contribution to output and price ﬂuctuations, and on the relative importance of ﬁscal and mon-
etary policy shocks, then it would be desirable to specify a structural VAR that jointly analyses
the two policies.
This result is in line with the suggestions of Leeper, Sims and Zha [1997] who underline
the importance of correctly identifying structural shocks by setting up larger models that can
trace the effects of policy shocks across a wider variety of variables. The authors identify
serious problems in models that imply signiﬁcant real effects of monetary policy and argue that
correcting these problems lowers the implied size of these effects.
We think that including ﬁscal variables in a basic monetary policy VAR is a correct thing
to do in order to understand the true contribution of monetary policy shocks to ﬂuctuations in
output and prices and the dynamic impact of these shocks.Appendix I. Data sources and construction of ﬁscal variables
All quarterly data come from NIPA (National Income and Product Account) and the FRED
database of the Federal Reserve of Saint Louis.
”Y”: gross domestic product seasonally adjusted billions 1992 $
”P”: gross domestic product implict price deﬂator 1992=100, seasonally adjusted
”PC”: Dow Jones index of spot commodity prices, average of daily ﬁgures
”R”: federal funds rate average of daily ﬁgures in percentage annual terms
”TR”: total reserves adjusted for changes in reserve requirements billions $
”PD”: federal government primary surplus(+) or deﬁcit(-)
”T”: federal revenue minus transfers billions $ seasonally adjusted
”G”: federal government current expenditure billions $ seasonally adjusted
Transfers = social security beneﬁts + social assistance grants + unfunded employee pension +
transfers to the rest of the world + net casualty premium + other transfers
Revenue=directtaxesonhouseholds+directtaxesonbusiness+indirecttaxes+socialsecurity
contributions received
Expenditure = consumption expenditure + grants to state and local governments + subsidies
Federal primary surplus = revenue - expenditure - transfers - consumption of ﬁxed capital - net
capital transfers received + property income - interest paid + interest receivedAppendix II. Identiﬁcation matrices








a11 0 0 0 0
a21 a22 a23 0 0
0 a32 a33 0 0
a41 a42 a43 a44 a45






















a11 0 0 0 0 0
a21 a22 a23 0 0 0
0 a32 a33 0 0 0
0 a42 a43 a44 0 0
a51 a52 a53 0 a55 a56


























a11 0 0 0 0 0 0
a21 a22 a23 a24 a25 0 0
0 a32 a33 0 0 0 0
0 a42 a43 a44 0 0 0
0 a52 a53 a54 a55 0 0
a61 a62 a63 0 0 a66 a67



























a11 0 0 0 0
a21 a22 a23 a24 a25
0 a32 a33 0 0
0 a42 a43 a44 0

















R = 0.045 · PC + 0.49 · Y + 0.799 · P + 0.378 · TR + vM
(0.027) (0.02) (0.045) (0.047)
PD-VAR
Monetary policy rule
R = 0.063 · PC + 0.555 · Y + 0.739 · P + 0.354 · TR + vM
(0.026) (0.019) (0.041) (0.031)
Fiscal policy rule




R = 0.047 · PC + 0.551 · Y + 0.88 · P + 0.362 · TR + vM
(0.002) (0.02) (0.05) (0.044)
Fiscal policy rule: taxes
T = 1.853 · Y + 6.384 · P + 0.092 · G + vT
(0.11) (0.234) (0.018)
Fiscal policy rule: expenditure
G = −0.122 · Y − 0.062 · P + vG
(0.053) (0.118)
aThe estimates refer to the policy equations coefﬁcients of the corresponding A0 matrices.
bStandard errors are reported in parentheses.Table 2
Variance decomposition: M-VAR
quarters real GDP GDP deﬂator
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 6 12 20 1 4 8
16 10 20 32 4 11 22
40 14 24 38 11 25 42
Table 3
Variance decomposition real GDP: PD-VAR
quarters ﬁscal monetary
2 0 0 1 0 0 1 (0 0 0)
8 2 5 10 1 4 10 (6 12 20)
16 5 10 18 3 8 15 (10 20 32)
40 6 12 19 4 9 16 (14 24 38)
Figures in parentheses refer to the M-VAR.
Table 4
Variance decomposition GDP deﬂator: PD-VAR
quarters ﬁscal monetary
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 (0 0 0)
8 0 2 5 0 2 5 (1 4 8)
16 1 5 12 1 5 12 (4 11 22)
40 10 22 36 2 9 21 (11 25 42)
Figures in parentheses refer to the M-VAR.
All tables above report .68 ﬂat-prior probability intervals and median contributions.Table 5
Variance decomposition real GDP: RE-VAR
quarters expend. revenue monetary
2 1 2 4 0 1 2 0 0 1 (0 0 0)
8 1 3 6 1 3 8 1 4 9 (6 12 20)
16 2 4 9 3 8 17 3 8 14 (10 20 32)
40 2 5 10 4 9 18 4 8 14 (14 24 38)
Figures in parentheses refer to the M-VAR.
Table 6
Variance decomposition GDP deﬂator: RE-VAR
quarters expend. revenue monetary
2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 (0 0 0)
8 0 1 2 0 2 5 1 3 7 (1 4 8)
16 0 1 4 1 6 13 2 6 13 (4 11 22)
40 1 3 8 5 15 30 2 9 20 (11 25 42)
Figures in parentheses refer to the M-VAR.
All tables above report .68 ﬂat-prior probability intervals and median contributions.Table 7
Distancea test on ﬁrst component of impulse responses
quarters distance Y p-value distance P p-value
1b 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
2 0.048 (0.016) 0.000 (0.001) 0.003 (0.013) 0.445 (0.000)
3 0.106 (0.060) 0.000 (0.000) 0.003 (0.012) 0.639 (0.010)
4 0.178 (0.118) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.021) 0.875 (0.005)
5 0.183 (0.124) 0.000 (0.000) 0.006 (0.017) 0.718 (0.161)
6 0.163 (0.105) 0.000 (0.000) 0.023 (0.003) 0.364 (0.886)
7 0.178 (0.150) 0.000 (0.000) 0.042 (0.019) 0.280 (0.575)
8 0.185 (0.147) 0.000 (0.000) 0.052 (0.032) 0.356 (0.504)
9 0.185 (0.159) 0.000 (0.000) 0.065 (0.047) 0.399 (0.486)
10 0.181 (0.148) 0.001 (0.009) 0.087 (0.064) 0.390 (0.472)
11 0.181 (0.147) 0.019 (0.049) 0.113 (0.083) 0.377 (0.463)
12 0.180 (0.131) 0.075 (0.168) 0.134 (0.099) 0.394 (0.473)
13 0.183 (0.130) 0.142 (0.259) 0.154 (0.116) 0.413 (0.487)
14 0.167 (0.121) 0.261 (0.376) 0.177 (0.131) 0.422 (0.506)
15 0.158 (0.121) 0.364 (0.445) 0.205 (0.148) 0.416 (0.517)
16 0.151 (0.121) 0.443 (0.501) 0.231 (0.161) 0.418 (0.537)
17 0.150 (0.125) 0.491 (0.527) 0.253 (0.173) 0.426 (0.556)
18 0.138 (0.131) 0.555 (0.542) 0.278 (0.187) 0.429 (0.568)
19 0.133 (0.139) 0.589 (0.546) 0.306 (0.201) 0.425 (0.580)
20 0.131 (0.152) 0.610 (0.532) 0.332 (0.213) 0.424 (0.591)
21 0.131 (0.159) 0.619 (0.534) 0.356 (0.228) 0.426 (0.597)
22 0.131 (0.167) 0.622 (0.522) 0.379 (0.243) 0.428 (0.602)
23 0.130 (0.167) 0.623 (0.530) 0.403 (0.259) 0.428 (0.603)
24 0.130 (0.168) 0.618 (0.531) 0.426 (0.277) 0.428 (0.601)
25 0.137 (0.170) 0.589 (0.522) 0.446 (0.295) 0.430 (0.598)
26 0.144 (0.168) 0.558 (0.519) 0.464 (0.313) 0.431 (0.593)
27 0.150 (0.159) 0.521 (0.524) 0.482 (0.331) 0.431 (0.587)
28 0.158 (0.156) 0.474 (0.513) 0.499 (0.348) 0.430 (0.581)
29 0.167 (0.152) 0.419 (0.502) 0.514 (0.365) 0.428 (0.574)
30 0.178 (0.149) 0.355 (0.479) 0.528 (0.379) 0.426 (0.567)
31 0.186 (0.146) 0.293 (0.453) 0.542 (0.392) 0.422 (0.561)
32 0.191 (0.143) 0.236 (0.421) 0.556 (0.403) 0.416 (0.555)
Figures not in parentheses refer to the M-VAR against the PD-VAR.
Figures in parentheses refer to the M-VAR against the RE-VAR.
a The distance is the absolute value of the differences of the responses to a monetary
policy shock.
b The impact response of output and prices is restricted to zero in all VARs.Table 8
Distancea test on second component of impulse responses
quarters distance Y p-value distance P p-value
1b 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
2 0.048 (0.016) 0.000 (0.000) 0.003 (0.013) 0.621 (0.013)
3 0.106 (0.060) 0.000 (0.000) 0.003 (0.012) 0.846 (0.386)
4 0.178 (0.118) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.021) 0.950 (0.361)
5 0.183 (0.124) 0.000 (0.019) 0.006 (0.017) 0.879 (0.604)
6 0.163 (0.105) 0.011 (0.148) 0.023 (0.003) 0.676 (0.946)
7 0.178 (0.150) 0.041 (0.109) 0.042 (0.019) 0.570 (0.765)
8 0.185 (0.147) 0.114 (0.231) 0.052 (0.032) 0.579 (0.692)
9 0.185 (0.159) 0.187 (0.280) 0.065 (0.047) 0.567 (0.645)
10 0.181 (0.148) 0.258 (0.374) 0.087 (0.064) 0.513 (0.599)
11 0.181 (0.147) 0.311 (0.416) 0.113 (0.083) 0.460 (0.556)
12 0.180 (0.131) 0.341 (0.488) 0.134 (0.099) 0.429 (0.526)
13 0.183 (0.130) 0.352 (0.505) 0.154 (0.116) 0.394 (0.493)
14 0.167 (0.121) 0.391 (0.534) 0.177 (0.131) 0.345 (0.459)
15 0.158 (0.121) 0.389 (0.518) 0.205 (0.148) 0.277 (0.413)
16 0.151 (0.121) 0.363 (0.485) 0.231 (0.161) 0.214 (0.369)
17 0.150 (0.125) 0.298 (0.419) 0.253 (0.173) 0.152 (0.317)
18 0.138 (0.131) 0.233 (0.318) 0.278 (0.187) 0.086 (0.247)
19 0.133 (0.139) 0.116 (0.187) 0.306 (0.201) 0.033 (0.168)
20 0.131 (0.152) 0.007 (0.041) 0.332 (0.213) 0.006 (0.091)
21 0.131 (0.159) 0.000 (0.001) 0.356 (0.228) 0.001 (0.027)
22 0.131 (0.167) 0.000 (0.000) 0.379 (0.243) 0.000 (0.002)
23 0.130 (0.167) 0.010 (0.000) 0.403 (0.259) 0.000 (0.000)
24 0.130 (0.168) 0.096 (0.009) 0.426 (0.277) 0.000 (0.000)
25 0.137 (0.170) 0.176 (0.051) 0.446 (0.295) 0.000 (0.000)
26 0.144 (0.168) 0.234 (0.121) 0.464 (0.313) 0.000 (0.000)
27 0.150 (0.159) 0.261 (0.194) 0.482 (0.331) 0.000 (0.000)
28 0.158 (0.156) 0.269 (0.249) 0.499 (0.348) 0.000 (0.001)
29 0.167 (0.152) 0.253 (0.284) 0.514 (0.365) 0.000 (0.002)
30 0.178 (0.149) 0.221 (0.298) 0.528 (0.379) 0.001 (0.008)
31 0.186 (0.146) 0.186 (0.297) 0.542 (0.392) 0.001 (0.019)
32 0.191 (0.143) 0.146 (0.282) 0.556 (0.403) 0.003 (0.033)
Figures not in parentheses refer to the M-VAR against the PD-VAR.
Figures in parentheses refer to the M-VAR against the RE-VAR.
a The distance is the absolute value of the differences of the responses to a monetary
policy shock.
b The impact response of output and prices is restricted to zero in all VARs.Table 9
Distancea test on third component of impulse responses
quarters distance Y p-value distance P p-value
1b 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
2 0.048 (0.016) 0.000 (0.092) 0.003 (0.013) 0.582 (0.033)
3 0.106 (0.060) 0.000 (0.019) 0.003 (0.012) 0.839 (0.422)
4 0.178 (0.118) 0.000 (0.011) 0.001 (0.021) 0.950 (0.428)
5 0.183 (0.124) 0.002 (0.057) 0.006 (0.017) 0.882 (0.656)
6 0.163 (0.105) 0.035 (0.206) 0.023 (0.003) 0.672 (0.952)
7 0.178 (0.150) 0.060 (0.148) 0.042 (0.019) 0.542 (0.785)
8 0.185 (0.147) 0.103 (0.210) 0.052 (0.032) 0.520 (0.690)
9 0.185 (0.159) 0.120 (0.186) 0.065 (0.047) 0.468 (0.601)
10 0.181 (0.148) 0.125 (0.190) 0.087 (0.064) 0.357 (0.497)
11 0.181 (0.147) 0.094 (0.148) 0.113 (0.083) 0.222 (0.375)
12 0.180 (0.131) 0.054 (0.107) 0.134 (0.099) 0.111 (0.247)
13 0.183 (0.130) 0.010 (0.024) 0.154 (0.116) 0.029 (0.110)
14 0.167 (0.121) 0.000 (0.000) 0.177 (0.131) 0.000 (0.016)
15 0.158 (0.121) 0.000 (0.000) 0.205 (0.148) 0.000 (0.000)
16 0.151 (0.121) 0.000 (0.000) 0.231 (0.161) 0.000 (0.000)
17 0.150 (0.125) 0.004 (0.026) 0.253 (0.173) 0.000 (0.000)
18 0.138 (0.131) 0.059 (0.086) 0.278 (0.187) 0.000 (0.000)
19 0.133 (0.139) 0.135 (0.120) 0.306 (0.201) 0.000 (0.000)
20 0.131 (0.152) 0.175 (0.109) 0.332 (0.213) 0.000 (0.003)
21 0.131 (0.159) 0.173 (0.085) 0.356 (0.228) 0.000 (0.005)
22 0.131 (0.167) 0.132 (0.042) 0.379 (0.243) 0.000 (0.004)
23 0.130 (0.167) 0.061 (0.011) 0.403 (0.259) 0.000 (0.001)
24 0.130 (0.168) 0.003 (0.000) 0.426 (0.277) 0.000 (0.000)
25 0.137 (0.170) 0.000 (0.000) 0.446 (0.295) 0.000 (0.000)
26 0.144 (0.168) 0.000 (0.000) 0.464 (0.313) 0.000 (0.000)
27 0.150 (0.159) 0.002 (0.000) 0.482 (0.331) 0.000 (0.000)
28 0.158 (0.156) 0.050 (0.021) 0.499 (0.348) 0.000 (0.000)
29 0.167 (0.152) 0.125 (0.102) 0.514 (0.365) 0.000 (0.000)
30 0.178 (0.149) 0.178 (0.192) 0.528 (0.379) 0.000 (0.000)
31 0.186 (0.146) 0.215 (0.261) 0.542 (0.392) 0.000 (0.000)
32 0.191 (0.143) 0.235 (0.310) 0.556 (0.403) 0.000 (0.000)
Figures not in parentheses refer to the M-VAR against the PD-VAR.
Figures in parentheses refer to the M-VAR against the RE-VAR.
a The distance is the absolute value of the differences of the responses to a monetary
policy shock.
b The impact response of output and prices is restricted to zero in all VARs.Table 10
Overall distancea test
component χ2 Y p-value χ2 P p-value
ﬁrst 368.56 (409.08) 0.0 (0.0) 19.45 (54.30) 0.960 (0.008)
second 398.34 (165.54) 0.0 (0.0) 834.75 (825.67) 0.0 (0.0)
third 393.31 (569.86) 0.0 (0.0) 3292.18 (2001.58) 0.0 (0.0)
Figures not in parentheses refer to the M-VAR against the PD-VAR.
Figures in parentheses refer to the M-VAR against the RE-VAR.
a The distance is the absolute value of the differences of the responses to a monetary
policy shock.Fed. funds rate
primary sur./GDP























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 7 Fiscal policy shock: second component .68 and .95 probability bands (PD-VAR)
Fiscal policy



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 14 Fiscal policy shock (expenditure): second component .68 and .95 probability bands
(RE-VAR)Fiscal policy: revenue











































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 21 Expenditure shock: second component .68 and .95 probability bands (F-VAR)References
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